Schedule
September 24, 2022
All talks are 60 minutes long.
10 AM: Two-person zero-sum games without expected utility preferences: a proposal (Siddharth Chatterjee, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi).
Abstract. A solution concept for two–person zero–sum games is proposed with players' preferences only assumed to satisfy Independence. To each player, there is a set of admissible strategies assuring him minimum guarantees. Moreover, rationality requires players to reject non–admissible strategies from any further consideration. Additional knowledge assumptions allow iterated elimination of non-admissible strategies. This leads to a pair of strategy sets, one for each player, whose cross product are the consideration equilibria. Consideration equilibria always exist and include Nash equilibria if any. Further, consideration equilibria and Nash equilibria (or, minimax strategies) coincide if players’ preferences additionally satisfy Continuity.
11 AM: Optimal intermediary test- and disclosure-design (Ayush Pant, Ashoka University).
Abstract. An intermediary designs and prices tests to facilitate signaling between a sender and a receiver and considers disclosure schemes to maximize his profit. The intermediary either discloses all test results to the receiver (full disclosure) or delegates disclosure to the sender (delegated disclosure). While giving the option to hide the bad results attracts the low-ability test takers and increases the revenue of the intermediary, it makes the test less informative. We show that the intermediary is indifferent between the two disclosure schemes: within each disclosure scheme design, more difficult tests increase the willingness to pay of the more able senders but reduce that of the less able senders. Further, we show that the intermediary is not indifferent between different tests with the same overall informativeness. Notably, the intermediary designs the easiest test to convince the receiver of the sender's ability. We show that this feature of the within scheme design, together with the need for tests to be informative, makes the intermediary and the sender indifferent between the two schemes.
12:15 PM: Non-linear regret: Menu effects in risk attitudes and behavioral anomalies (Pranjal Bhusan, Ashoka University).
Abstract. We introduce a decision theoretic model that captures regret. Our model features an environment of uncertainty. Regret influences behavior when ex ante, the decision maker’s choice of which gamble to choose is influenced by a concern that, ex post, once uncertainty resolves, her choice may turn out to be an inferior one. We behaviorally characterize the model. We also highlight behavioral anomalies and menu effects in risk attitudes that result because of a concern about regret.
10 AM: Two-person zero-sum games without expected utility preferences: a proposal (Siddharth Chatterjee, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi).
Abstract. A solution concept for two–person zero–sum games is proposed with players' preferences only assumed to satisfy Independence. To each player, there is a set of admissible strategies assuring him minimum guarantees. Moreover, rationality requires players to reject non–admissible strategies from any further consideration. Additional knowledge assumptions allow iterated elimination of non-admissible strategies. This leads to a pair of strategy sets, one for each player, whose cross product are the consideration equilibria. Consideration equilibria always exist and include Nash equilibria if any. Further, consideration equilibria and Nash equilibria (or, minimax strategies) coincide if players’ preferences additionally satisfy Continuity.
11 AM: Optimal intermediary test- and disclosure-design (Ayush Pant, Ashoka University).
Abstract. An intermediary designs and prices tests to facilitate signaling between a sender and a receiver and considers disclosure schemes to maximize his profit. The intermediary either discloses all test results to the receiver (full disclosure) or delegates disclosure to the sender (delegated disclosure). While giving the option to hide the bad results attracts the low-ability test takers and increases the revenue of the intermediary, it makes the test less informative. We show that the intermediary is indifferent between the two disclosure schemes: within each disclosure scheme design, more difficult tests increase the willingness to pay of the more able senders but reduce that of the less able senders. Further, we show that the intermediary is not indifferent between different tests with the same overall informativeness. Notably, the intermediary designs the easiest test to convince the receiver of the sender's ability. We show that this feature of the within scheme design, together with the need for tests to be informative, makes the intermediary and the sender indifferent between the two schemes.
12:15 PM: Non-linear regret: Menu effects in risk attitudes and behavioral anomalies (Pranjal Bhusan, Ashoka University).
Abstract. We introduce a decision theoretic model that captures regret. Our model features an environment of uncertainty. Regret influences behavior when ex ante, the decision maker’s choice of which gamble to choose is influenced by a concern that, ex post, once uncertainty resolves, her choice may turn out to be an inferior one. We behaviorally characterize the model. We also highlight behavioral anomalies and menu effects in risk attitudes that result because of a concern about regret.
Logistics
Venue: From June 2020, we will have workshops on webinars. Details will be sent by email.
Previous Workshops
November 07, 2020
Sarvesh Bandhu (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi): A stronger characterization of obvious strategy-proofness
Parimal Bag (National University of Singapore): Honesty or Talent? Project Implementation with Possibility of Backstabbing
Srijita Ghosh (Ashoka University): Convincing non-believers by silence: information Design in presence of negative externality
June 06, 2020
Anup Pramanik (Shiv Nadar University): Bottom non-manipulability: Relaxing incentive compatibility in the voting model
Debasis Mishra (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi): Selling two identical objects
February 15, 2020
Garima Shakya (Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur): How hard is it to protect elections?
Pranjal Chandrakar (Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore): Renewal contracts and lease auctions
Dyotona Dasgupta (Delhi School of Economics): A theory of progressive lending
November 9, 2019
Sreoshi Banerjee (Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata): Sequencing problems with ex-post participation constraints and incentives
Samarth Gupta (NCAER, Delhi): Optimal contract for heterogeneous recruiters
Jeevant Rampal (Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad): Optimal monopoly mechanisms with demand uncertainty
October 12, 2019
Raghvi Garg (Ashoka University): Torn between want and should: A model of behavioral choices
Sarvesh Bandhu (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi): Issues in social choice theory
Sanyyam Khurana (Delhi School of Economics): Auctions with resale and correlated valuations
August 17, 2019
Aditya Vikram (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi): Stability and double auction design
Dyotona Dasgupta (Delhi School of Economics): Self confidence and poverty trap
Srijita Ghosh (Ashoka University): Multidimensional and selective learning
April 20, 2019
Mihir Bhattacharya (Ashoka University): The preference of the majority is the most representative of all preferences
Ankush Garg (Delhi School of Economics): Political correctness in committees
Vishruti Gupta (Delhi School of Economics): Transport costs and demand clusters: market structure and efficiency
February 9, 2019
Mihir Bhattacharya (Ashoka University): The preference of the majority is the most representative of all preferences
Ankush Garg (Delhi School of Economics): Political correctness in committees
Vishruti Gupta (Delhi School of Economics): Transport costs and demand clusters: market structure and efficiency
October 13, 2018
Abhinash Borah (Ashoka University): Rational choices: an ecological foundation
Sneha Bakshi: Dynamic pricing in two-sided platforms: price or commission
Dhritiman Gupta (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi): Collective action in the presence of anonymity concerns
August 4, 2018
Anujit Chakraborty (University of California, Davis): Cooperation in FRPD games
Ruhi Sonal (Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi): Sequential entry and perfect equilibrium
Rakesh Chaturvedi (Indraprastha Institute of Information Technology, Delhi): Trading mechanisms for land assembly and eminent domain
February 3, 2018
Sarvesh Bandhu (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi): An impossibility under locally consistent random social choice functions
Sharman Banerjee (OP Jindal University): Dynamic screening of buyers with time inconsistency
Sugat Chaturvedi (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi): Group size and political representation under alternate electoral systems
October 7, 2017
Prabal Roy Chowdhury (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi): How to select a leader: talent vs trust
Jeevant Rampal (Ohio State University): Optimal monopoly mechanism with demand uncertainty
Kolagani Paramahamsa (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi): Selling to a naive agent with two selves
August 5, 2017
Souvik Dutta (Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore): Social reform as path to political leadership: a dynamic model
Ritesh Jain (Ohio State University): Rationalizable implementation with transfers
Sushama Murty (Jawaharlal Nehru University): Optimal commodity taxation with production and consumption externalities: implications for GST/VAT
April 1, 2017
Deepal Basak (Indian School of Business): Diffusing coordination risk
Arunava Sen (ISI Delhi): Matching with homophily
Soumendu Sarkar (TERI University): Bargaining for land acquisition
February 4, 2017
Ruhi Sonal (IIT, Delhi): Proximity and stochastic choice
Anup Pramanik (Osaka University): On strategy-proof social choice between two alternatives
October 1, 2016
Abhinash Borah (Ashoka University): Individual sense of justice and Harsanyi's impartial observer: accommodating procedural fairness in welfare assessments
Shraman Banerjee (OP Jindal School of Government and Public Policy): Asymmetric dynamic price mechanism for symmetric buyers
Debasis Mishra (ISI Delhi): A simple mechanism for allocating a bequest
August 6, 2016
Bhaskar Dutta (Ashoka University and Warwick University): Rational expectations and farsighted stability
Dyotona Dasgupta (ISI Delhi): Dynamic incentives and compulsory savings in microfinance
Rakesh Chaturvedi (IIM Udaipur): Stable property rights
Sudhir Shah (Delhi School of Economics): The generalized Arrow-Prat coefficient
November 07, 2020
Sarvesh Bandhu (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi): A stronger characterization of obvious strategy-proofness
Parimal Bag (National University of Singapore): Honesty or Talent? Project Implementation with Possibility of Backstabbing
Srijita Ghosh (Ashoka University): Convincing non-believers by silence: information Design in presence of negative externality
June 06, 2020
Anup Pramanik (Shiv Nadar University): Bottom non-manipulability: Relaxing incentive compatibility in the voting model
Debasis Mishra (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi): Selling two identical objects
February 15, 2020
Garima Shakya (Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur): How hard is it to protect elections?
Pranjal Chandrakar (Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore): Renewal contracts and lease auctions
Dyotona Dasgupta (Delhi School of Economics): A theory of progressive lending
November 9, 2019
Sreoshi Banerjee (Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata): Sequencing problems with ex-post participation constraints and incentives
Samarth Gupta (NCAER, Delhi): Optimal contract for heterogeneous recruiters
Jeevant Rampal (Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad): Optimal monopoly mechanisms with demand uncertainty
October 12, 2019
Raghvi Garg (Ashoka University): Torn between want and should: A model of behavioral choices
Sarvesh Bandhu (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi): Issues in social choice theory
Sanyyam Khurana (Delhi School of Economics): Auctions with resale and correlated valuations
August 17, 2019
Aditya Vikram (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi): Stability and double auction design
Dyotona Dasgupta (Delhi School of Economics): Self confidence and poverty trap
Srijita Ghosh (Ashoka University): Multidimensional and selective learning
April 20, 2019
Mihir Bhattacharya (Ashoka University): The preference of the majority is the most representative of all preferences
Ankush Garg (Delhi School of Economics): Political correctness in committees
Vishruti Gupta (Delhi School of Economics): Transport costs and demand clusters: market structure and efficiency
February 9, 2019
Mihir Bhattacharya (Ashoka University): The preference of the majority is the most representative of all preferences
Ankush Garg (Delhi School of Economics): Political correctness in committees
Vishruti Gupta (Delhi School of Economics): Transport costs and demand clusters: market structure and efficiency
October 13, 2018
Abhinash Borah (Ashoka University): Rational choices: an ecological foundation
Sneha Bakshi: Dynamic pricing in two-sided platforms: price or commission
Dhritiman Gupta (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi): Collective action in the presence of anonymity concerns
August 4, 2018
Anujit Chakraborty (University of California, Davis): Cooperation in FRPD games
Ruhi Sonal (Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi): Sequential entry and perfect equilibrium
Rakesh Chaturvedi (Indraprastha Institute of Information Technology, Delhi): Trading mechanisms for land assembly and eminent domain
February 3, 2018
Sarvesh Bandhu (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi): An impossibility under locally consistent random social choice functions
Sharman Banerjee (OP Jindal University): Dynamic screening of buyers with time inconsistency
Sugat Chaturvedi (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi): Group size and political representation under alternate electoral systems
October 7, 2017
Prabal Roy Chowdhury (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi): How to select a leader: talent vs trust
Jeevant Rampal (Ohio State University): Optimal monopoly mechanism with demand uncertainty
Kolagani Paramahamsa (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi): Selling to a naive agent with two selves
August 5, 2017
Souvik Dutta (Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore): Social reform as path to political leadership: a dynamic model
Ritesh Jain (Ohio State University): Rationalizable implementation with transfers
Sushama Murty (Jawaharlal Nehru University): Optimal commodity taxation with production and consumption externalities: implications for GST/VAT
April 1, 2017
Deepal Basak (Indian School of Business): Diffusing coordination risk
Arunava Sen (ISI Delhi): Matching with homophily
Soumendu Sarkar (TERI University): Bargaining for land acquisition
February 4, 2017
Ruhi Sonal (IIT, Delhi): Proximity and stochastic choice
Anup Pramanik (Osaka University): On strategy-proof social choice between two alternatives
October 1, 2016
Abhinash Borah (Ashoka University): Individual sense of justice and Harsanyi's impartial observer: accommodating procedural fairness in welfare assessments
Shraman Banerjee (OP Jindal School of Government and Public Policy): Asymmetric dynamic price mechanism for symmetric buyers
Debasis Mishra (ISI Delhi): A simple mechanism for allocating a bequest
August 6, 2016
Bhaskar Dutta (Ashoka University and Warwick University): Rational expectations and farsighted stability
Dyotona Dasgupta (ISI Delhi): Dynamic incentives and compulsory savings in microfinance
Rakesh Chaturvedi (IIM Udaipur): Stable property rights
Sudhir Shah (Delhi School of Economics): The generalized Arrow-Prat coefficient